Seventh Fleet Command Post Exercise Fleet Battle Experiment Kilo Fires Initiative Final Report by Schacher, Gordon Everett & Gallup, Shelley
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2003-05-01
Seventh Fleet Command Post Exercise
Fleet Battle Experiment Kilo Fires
Initiative Final Report
Schacher, Gordon Everett




















               Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
 
                                             Prepared for:  Navy Warfare Development Command 




Seventh Fleet Command Post Exercise 
Fleet Battle Experiment Kilo 
Fires Initiative Final Report 
 
 
Gordon Schacher and Shelley Gallup 


















Wayne "Doc" Sweitzer 
Provided significant material used directly in the Reconstruction Section of this report. 
 
Rich Kimmel 
Provided the section on JFACC processes. 
 
Nelson Irvine and Sue Hutchins  




NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 93943-5000 
 
 
RADM David R. Ellison, USN       Richard Elster 
Superintendent                                                                                     Provost 
 
This report was prepared for:  Navy Warfare Development Command 
     
 
Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized. 
 
This report was prepared by:  Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering  




_________________                                                  __________________ 
Gordon Schacher      Shelley P. Gallup                          





Reviewed by:                                                                          Released by: 
 
________________________                                     ____________________ 
Phil DePoy, Director                                                     D. W. Netzer 
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering       Associate Provost and 
                                                                                      Dean of Research     
 v
         
  
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
 
Form approved  
 
OMB No 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data 
sources, 
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of 
this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 
20503. 
1.  AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
 
2.  REPORT DATE 
      28 May 03 
3.  REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
      Research               
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
   Seventh Fleet Command Post Exercise 
Fleet Battle Experiment Kilo Fires Initiative Final Report 
 
5. FUNDING 
  Navy Warfare Development Command  
        
6.  AUTHOR(S) 




7.  PERFORMING  ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering 
Naval Postgraduate School 
777 Dyer Rd., Room 100D, Monterey,  CA  93943 
 
8.  PERFORMING  ORGANIZATION 
     REPORT NUMBER 
          
 
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
     Navy Warfare Development Command  
     Naval War College  
     Newport, Rhode Island  
 
10.  SPONSORING/MONITORING 
       AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11.  SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
 
 
12a.  DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
   Unlimited 
    
12b.  DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
 
                          
 
 
13.  ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words.) 
       
Fleet Battle Experiment was conducted during Seventh Fleet exercise Tandem Thrust 03.  During the Command Post Exercise phase, testing of 
Time Sensitive Targets processes using the Joint Fires Network was carried out.  This report covers training and use of the TES-N portion of the 
Joint Fires Network.   
 
14.  SUBJECT TERMS 
Time Sensitive Targets, Command and Control, Network Information Systems 
       
15.  NUMBER OF  PAGES  
   32 
              
 16.  PRICE CODE 
 
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
       OF REPORT 
       Unclassified 
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
       OF THIS PAGE 
       Unclassified 
19.  SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
        OF ABSTRACT 
         Unclassified 
20.  LIMITATION OF 
      ABSTRACT                            
          
NSN 7540-01-280-5800                        Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
                          Prescribed by ANSI Std 239-18 
 1
   
Table of Contents 
 
 
1.0  Principal Results      3 
 
2.0  Introduction     13 
2.1 Command Post Exercise    14 
2.2 Navy Fires Initiative    14 
 
3.0  Reconstruction     17 
3.1. Impacts on the Experiment    17 
3.1.1      Reduced Manning Impacts   17 
3.1.2      Lack of Sufficient Training Impacts  18 
3.1.3       Systems / Data Impacts    19 
3.1.4      Equipment Status Matrix    20 
3.2 Experiment Planned Events    24 
3.2.1      Modifications to Planned Events   28 
3.3 Daily Context Summary   29 
3.4 Summary of Context Consequences  30 
 
4.0  Results      33 
4.1 Simulation Impact on Training  33 
4.2 Personnel Capabilities   34 
4.3 Operator Acceptance of TES-N   35 
4.4 TST Process Performance Times  35 
4.5 JFN and the TST Process    36 
4.6 Range Of Validity for Results   37 
 
5.0  Recommendations    39 
5.1 Fleet Follow-Up    39 
5.2 Experimentation Structure    39 
5.3 Experimentation Hardware    40 
5.4 Experimentation Data    40 
5.5 Experiment Planning Stability   41 
5.6 Simulation and Training   41 
 
Appendix A  TST Timelines     43 
Appendix B  CJTF TST Process - TT03 CPX 47 

















1.0  PRINCIPAL RESULTS  
 
The following principal results have been extracted from the body of this report.  They are those 
deemed most significant for the objectives of this initiative and for the experiment as a whole.   
 
The format of these results is meant to facilitate their use for presentations.  The results for each 
area of interest are presented on a single page:  there are highlights within a box, as might be 
inserted in a Power Point or view graph, followed below it by a more lengthy explanation of 





















This initiative was to test JFN support for TST, and the associated SOP, for operations in the 
three roles for which it will be employed by C7F:   
as an embarked CJTF with other supported staff(s) embarked,  
as an embarked JFMCC/NAVFOR, and  
as the Fleet JFN/JFN supporting deployed RTCs and RTC Lites. 
 
Key equipment components were an afloat JFN (supporting the JTF staff and a JFACC forward) 
and an ISR-M supporting the JFACC Main.   
 
Key participants include the entire CJTF command structure and Component Commanders.  
JFACC participation was essential to meet the majority of objectives in addition to supporting 
examination of USAF ISR Manager (ISRM) to JFN operations. 
 
The CPX was the only time during TT03 that full CJTF manning was to be in place, which is 
necessary to validate the CONOPS and associated standing procedures.   
 
Not having a manned JFACC Afloat eliminated a major component of SOP testing that was to be 
accomplished.  JAOC personnel shortage also had a detrimental effect on exercising the SOP. 
 
With one exception, personnel in the JIC had no experience with TES-N.  The result was that a 
major portion of CPX was devoted to training rather than initiative experimentation.  
 
Equipment difficulties also played a major role in reducing the ability to obtain results for this 
initiative (see PR #2).   
 
The basic objectives of this initiative could not be met.  Indications of needed SOP development 
for a JIC, if it is to participate in TST, were determined.  
  
 
FBE-Kilo, Command Post Exercise Phase 
 
PR #1 - Achievement of SOP Testing Objective 
 
• Experimentation difficulties prevented an adequate determination.  
 
o No manning of JFACC Afloat.   
 
o Lack of JAOC manning.  
 
o TES-N operators lack of training.  
 
• CPX was modified to be mostly training for FTX. 
FBE-Kilo, Command Post Exercise Phase 
 
PR #2 - Achievement of JFN Contributions to TST Objective 
 
 



















The stated JFN objective was to determine the contribution of JFN to TST prosecution.  In order 
to determine JFN-unique contributions, or synergistic JFN effects, a baseline of performance 
without JFN is needed.  Such a baseline requires using the same C2 structure and information 
processes as were used in the experiment.  Baseline information is not available.    
 
Equipment problems prevented testing end-to-end JFN performance.  Target nominations could 
not be passed directly from TES-N to ADOCS, or directly to ISRM.  FBEnet was not operational 
due to Ku Band switching problems in Hawaii.  The result was that many information paths that 
are crucial for realizing JFN potential were not operational.   
 
Because of the collection of equipment and manning problems the only comprehensive test of 
JFN that could be made was of the TES-N component in the JIC.   
 
The basic objectives of this initiative could not be met.  Results that could be derived are 





















Image analysis and processing worked well, essentially creating/producing an efficient assembly 
line.  Operators, with little training, were able to explore images and make both analysis and 
processing decisions fairly quickly.  (Difficulties encountered because of the simulation are 
covered in a subsequent Principal Result.)   
 
An important capability was for the image analyst to be able to direct tactical sensors.  The 
analyst worked through a sensor manager and the process worked moderately well.  There were 
difficulties with this sensor control, as implemented, in that there was no direct provision for 
sensor control at the analyst's terminal.  A direct link that the analyst can use without 
interrupting, nor losing sight of, imagery is needed.   
 
There were problems with imagery information content.  Transmission of aim points and Lat-
Long needs to be improved.  This was done verbally or by notes, which slowed the process.  
 
FBE-Kilo, Command Post Exercise Phase 
 
PR #3 - TES-N Capabilities    
 
 
• Works well for IMINT exploitation.   
 
o Video screener a major factor in closing TST timeline.  
 
o Directing tactical imagery assets.   
 
• Inability to drop validated aim points a major drawback.  
 
























The TES-N team leader in the JIC was an IS1 who had 9 months of intensive experience with the 
system.  He was the trainer for a team of three Sailors who had no experience or training on the 
system.  On-the-job training was performed during the experiment.  It is to be expected that the 
performance of well-trained operators would be better than those in the midst of training and that 
this had an impact on TST processes.  It was not possible to determine which process 
performance difficulties were the result of an operator lacking proficiency or due to JFN 
capability difficulties.   
 
It was surprising how fast the new operators learned how to use TES-N.  They were performing 
image analysis and TST nominations within a few hours of developing familiarity with the 
system.  This speaks well for the performance to be expected with JFN.   
 
Operator performance was hindered by their learning only that portion of the TST process they 
were performing.  Performance will improve when operators understand the full process and 
how the functions at the node they are working fits into the overall process.  
 
 
FBE-Kilo, Command Post Exercise Phase 
 
PR #4 - TES-N Personnel Issues 
 
• Only the team leader was an experienced operator.  
 
o Lack of operator training hindered TST operations.  
 
• New operators learned very fast.  
 
o Performed quite well with minimal training.  
 
o Could determine whether performance difficulties were due to     
equipment or training.  
 




















With the exception of the team leader, the TES-N operators were totally unfamiliar with the 
system and with TST processes.  Their training was on IPB.  Thus, they were being introduced to 
both a new system and a new process.  In spite of this they were enthusiastic about TES-N.   
 
They felt the system was easy to learn and that the graphical user interface (GUI) layout and 
methods of use were fairly intuitive.   
 
The system layout was such that a terminal could be used for image screening, image analysis, or 
nomination.  This allowed those operations to be exchanged or shared.  Having multiple 
functions resident within one machine produced manpower savings as a result of increased work 
efficiency and direct sharing of information between operators.  
FBE-Kilo, Command Post Exercise Phase 
 
PR #5 - Operator’s Acceptance of TES-N 
 
 
• In spite of lack of familiarity, operators recognized the system’s potential 
for improving performance and efficiency 
 
• User-friendly and easy to learn.  
 





















CPX was used to provide TES-N operator training in an operational context.  But, the simulation 
used for the experiment presented unrealistic renderings of battlefield objects.  This lack of 
realism interfered with operator performance and therefore with their training.  In addition to low 
fidelity, the presentation of the battlefield was such that image analysts could not distinguish 
different instances of the same object type.  This produced a situation where operators were 
moving back and forth between objects to figure out which was which, interfering with training. 
  
 
A realistic simulation designed specifically for TES-N training is needed.  
 
Operators did not have an understanding of the TST process.  Training on the TST process was 
being conducted at the same time as how to do it.  Training on the full TST process is needed as 
a prerequisite to system "knobology" training.   
 
FBE-Kilo, Command Post Exercise Phase 
 
PR #6 - TES-N Training Issues 
 
 
• Current simulation hinders training. 
 
o Lack of reality interfered with all aspects of training and performance.  
 
o Simulation designed specifically for TES-N training needed.  
 





















The exercise proceeded through the MSEL events in good fashion.  Due to a number of factors 
mentioned earlier it was not possible for the experiment to proceed in the same fashion.  The 
result was that the two became decoupled.  It was not clear that it was planned for the exercise to 
depend on information coming out of TES-N in the JIC, but in execution it did not.  Thus, the 
experiment became one that could have been performed anywhere.  A shipboard operation and a 
real operational environment were not needed nor used.   
 
This brings into question the wisdom of having operational field experiments be a principal 
information collection means.  Savings could be realized if Navy experimentation were to 
concentrate on learning spirals and having operational field experimentation done only when 
necessary to validate results in an operational environment.  
 
CPX suffered significantly from not having equipment operate properly.  A process is needed 
where an experiment is not undertaken until equipment has been fully tested, determined to be 
functioning properly, and warranted to be ready to fully support the experiment's objectives.   
FBE-Kilo, Command Post Exercise Phase 
 
PR #7 - Experimentation Issues 
 
 
• Experiment and Exercise were decoupled.  
 
• Greater emphasis needed on learning spirals prior to operational field 
experimentation. 
 
• Complete exercising of equipment and validation of functions required 
prior to operational field experimentation.  

























The pace of FBEs formerly has been such that the planning for the next experiment is underway 
before the current one is concluded, certainly before analysis is completed.  This has prevented 
lessons-learned from being carried forward to the next experiment.  It has also precluded 
investing the effort needed to follow up with the Fleet on system and process improvements.  
Much of the possible immediate value of FBE results has not been realized.  
 
FBE-K, even the CPX portion, present opportunities for Fleet follow-up.  Areas that have been 
identified as fruitful for doing this are:  
Development of TST SOP for an afloat CJTF  
Design of the processes for a Fleet Flagship to function as a JFN TST hub.  
Developing TST processes and SOP for less well-equipped ships/units. 
 
Undertaking these suggested Fleet follow-up items will require a shift of funds and manpower to 
this activity.   
 
FBE-Kilo, Command Post Exercise Phase 
 
PR #8 - Fleet Follow-Up 
 
 
• Little Fleet follow-up has occurred after former FBEs.   
 
o Operational improvements have been lost.  
 
o Fleet recommendations for program improvement have not occurred.  
 
• FBE-K opportunities.  
 
o TST SOP  
 
o Design of Fleet Flagship as a JFN TST hub.  
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2.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
The following italicized descriptions are taken directly from the Navy Warfare Development 
Command (NWDC) FBE Kilo Experiment Plan.  
 
Fleet Battle Experiment K (FBE K) will be conducted in the spring of 2003, the 11th experiment 
in the FBE series.  It will be conducted in conjunction with the USPACOM tier 1 level exercise, 
Tandem Thrust 03 (TT03). TT03 is comprised of two events, a Command Post Exercise (CPX) 
and a Field Training Exercise (FTX); FBE K will participate in both events.  
 
As part of FBE K, many of the Experiment’s initiatives will focus on the command and control 
(C2) processes centered at the joint force level.   A primary goal is to apply the concepts of 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) to the processes used to support a Joint Task Force (JTF) staff 
and a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) while they are embarked aboard a 
Joint Fires Network (JFN) equipped command platform (USS BLUE RIDGE LCC-19).   FBE K 
will concentrate on the allocation / reallocation of both weapons and sensors, target assignment, 
and fire mission deconfliction in support of the JFACC execution of Time Sensitive Targeting 
(TST) operations at the joint force and component level.   FBE K will use a common set of 
automated tools and common system architecture aboard the USS BLUE RIDGE that enables 
effective TST C2 and joint task force coordination. This flexible Joint Fires Initiative C2 
architecture is designed to increase the speed and tempo at which the JTF as a whole can 
conduct TST operations.  
 
In support of these goals, there were two Sea Strike Initiatives, JFN CONOPS and Coalition.  
The Initiative Statements for each in the Experiment Plan are: 
 
Initiative #1.  Refinement Of Commander, Seventh Fleet Joint Fires Network Concept of 
Operations (C7F JFN CONOPS) and Commander, Seventh Fleet / USS Blue Ridge Time 
Sensitive Targeting Standing Operating Procedures (C7F TST SOP).  
 
Initiative #2:  Establishment and examination of requirements for utilization of a Distributed 
Maritime Sensor and Fires network that integrates a coalition engagement node within that 
network.    
 
In October 2002 the C7F Flagship, USS BLUE RIDGE, received a TES-N installation.  Upon 
installation completion, the JFN Virtual Program Office developed a draft Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) tailored to C7F needs.  C7F requested NWDC assistance in refining the CONOPS 
and any underlying TT&P and validation of those documents during the Tandem Thrust ‘03 
(TT03) Command Post Exercise (CPX).   
 
The CPX is the only time during TT03 that full CJTF manning will be in place which is 
necessary to validate the CONOPS and associated standing procedures.  For this reason, this 
report on the CPX Fires Initiative #1 has been prepared.  A second report on the FTX portion of 
FBE-Kilo will be presented at a later date.   
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Initiative number one’s primary goal was to support C7F in refining and validating its C7F JFN 
CONOPS / C7F TST SOP.  This initiative will attempt, to the maximum extent possible, to 
define JFN support to operations in the three C7F roles for which it will be employed.  The roles 
are as an embarked CJTF with other supported staff(s) embarked, as an embarked 
JFMCC/NAVFOR, and as the Fleet JFN supporting deployed RTCs and RTC Lites. 
 
Additional benefits of this initiative include providing material to update the JFACC (Afloat) 
PACAF CONOPS, define personnel and training requirements for X-INT fusion to the Target 
Data Base, and examination of JFN impact on the Air Tasking Order (ATO) process.  Another 




2.1  COMMAND POST EXERCISE  
  
The purpose of the CPX was to exercise Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet operating as the 
Commander of a Joint Task Force with the U. S. Pacific Command.  This was done within the 
structure and scenarios of Tandem Thrust 03.  The exercise scenario involved defense of a 
fictitious island nation Guppie against an aggressor island nation Piranha.  The scenario was 
complicated by the presence of military forces from the fictitious nation of Orca, which was 
sympathetic to Piranha but not overtly engaged in aggressive action.   
 
U.S. Joint Task Force tasking included: 
 Secure SLOCs/ALOCs within the Joint Operating Area 
 Forcible entry.  Re-take friendly territory seized by aggressor nation 
 Conduct Humanitarian Assistance operations 
 Fortify/defend friendly nation(s) 
 Establish bases for future combat operations against aggressor 
 Eliminate aggressor’s ability to threaten region 
 
The command structure for the exercise was to include: 
 CJTF – COMSEVENTHFLT embarked USS BLUE RIDGE  
 JFACC - Main at Hickam AFB  
   - JFACC 80 person liaison detachment embarked USS BLUE RIDGE 
 JFLCC - embarked USS BLUE RIDGE 
 JFMCC – CTF 70 embarked USS CARL VINSON 









2.2 NAVY FIRES INITIATIVE 
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The purpose of the Navy Fires Initiative was primarily to determine the support to TST that can 
be provided by JFN.  The TES-N portion of JFN resided within and was utilized by the Joint 
Intelligence Center (JIC).  ADOCS was to be used for the engagement COP primarily in the 
Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) on the BLUE RIDGE.  The following equipment and 




Gale Lite On a TES MFWS applied to ELINT 
analysis. 
TES-N Nomination of TSTs.  Sensor management. 
JSIPS-N/PTW Georefinement of TST positions 
GCCS-M COP, track management. Track exchange 
with TES-N. 
Ku-band SATCOM network Support FBE network 
MUSE/AFSERS Simulated imagery and video for Predator, 
U-2 and Global Hawk 
JSAF In the CPX, supported imagery generation 
for MUSE/AFSERS.  In FTX,  JSAF was 
the stimulator for the full exercise. 
JTLS CPX  stimulator 
ADOCS Cross Component TST collaboration and 
TST target management 
IRC/IWS Collaboration 
IPL  Central imagery repository 
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3.0  RECONSTRUCTION 
 
3.1 IMPACTS ON THE EXPERIMENT 
 
Three circumstances significantly affected the ability to obtain the desired data for this Initiative. 
  Typhoon Kujira forced the ship to depart one day early, leaving many personnel ashore.  
 The Air Force decided not to man JFACC Afloat. 
 There were numerous equipment and information failures.  
The following reconstruction describes the impact of these events on the ability to meet initiative 
objectives.  Also provided is a listing of the daily TST events from the MSEL.   
 
Events which had major impacts on the experiment began before the experiment.  More than a 
month prior to the experiment, the proposed JFN/TST CONOPS was rejected by 7th Fleet and it 
was decided to instead use the PACAF TST SOP as its basis.  This SOP was not written for a 
JFACC Afloat with the CJTF so it was not entirely appropriate for carrying out this initiative's 
objectives.  However, it did provide a set of processes that could act as a baseline of sorts.  The 
result was that, rather than CONOPS evaluation and/or validation, the experiment shifted to a 
focus on observing and evaluating activities in order to formulate workable TTPs.   
 
Prior to the experiment it was also learned that the Air Force would not man a JFACC Afloat as 
planned,  partly due to policy and partly due to demands of the Iraqi Freedom operation.  As a 
result, it was decided that emphasis on the BLUE RIDGE during CPX would shift to assessing 
the effectiveness of TES-N in the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC).  In addition, manning of 
JFACC rear was reduced due to real-world operations, resulting in adapted form of processing 
TSTs through to engagement.   
 
This combination of a lack of CONOPS to test, manning changes, and equipment difficulties 
caused a refocusing of CPX to being mainly training for FTX.  Even so, data were obtained that 
shed light on training needs and on the use of JFN for TST by the Fleet.   
 
 
3.1.1 Reduced Manning Impacts  
 
Few Intelligence Analysts / TES-N Operators:  CPX had far too few intelligence analysts 
participating (normally one, sometimes three, as many as five -- but the latter two only 
momentarily and/or part time). 
- Cause:  This was at least partially due to C7F Staff having to fill TT03 positions left 
unfilled by lack of requested augmentees (due partially to real world situations such as “Gulf 
War II”, N. Korean activities, and for much of the time, typhoon avoidance which forced ship’s 
sortie from inport Guam prior to the arrival of many augmentees on the island). 
- Impact:  Information flow and related processes were slowed.  The one Intel Analyst 
(IS1 Karr), who participated consistently throughout, was over tasked and had to perform roles 
serially (e.g., screening video on TES-N, then acting as the PTW/IPL Operator).  
 
 
Few “Khaki” Supervisors / Analysts.  CPX had far too few intel “khaki” supervisors (no Chiefs, 
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one Officer for one day). 
- Impact:  C7F Science Advisor (civilian) and NWDC personnel had to fill key roles 
(e.g., Targeting Officer, JFN Operations Officer, JFN Supervisor, ISR Operations Officer).  This 
not only distracted them from accomplishment of other objectives, but also impacted the quality 
of the “team interaction” required. 
 
Scaled Back JFACC Participation:  CPX had no JFACC FWD personnel aboard (e.g., ISR 
Operations), and exercise architecture limited JFACC REAR participation during Find, Fix, 
Track, phases of the F2T2EA process.  JFACC ISR Section (ISR-M) was dependent on receiving 
timely input from BLUE RIDGE ISR Cell (TES-N).  ISR data flow connectivity between TES-N 
suite on BLUE RIDGE and ISR-M suite at AOC was intermittent which prevented JFACC TCT 
Cell from participating in TCT nomination decisions and other ISR Section responsibilities (e.g. 
Collections Management) necessary prior to target nomination.  The BLUE RIDGE decided to 
nominate all TSTs at sea and pass relevant details to the JFACC TCT Cell for prosecution. This 
adaptive process was not realistic nor responsive since the JFACC TCT Cell ISR Section was 
not included in collections management or control of the ISR missions. 
 - Impact:  The process did not exercise the necessary coordination between the JTF staff and the 
TST Authority (JFACC) during the critical ISR (Find, Fix, Track) phase.   
 
 No NWDC Intel Officer / JECG LNO:  Because of typhoon avoidance, the NWDC Intelligence 
Officer did not make it aboard for the entire CPX. 
- Impact:  His roles as liaison with both the JECG and the C7F N2 and other Staff had to 
be picked up by NWDC ISR/Fires personnel, meaning less of their time, focus, and energy 
devoted to accomplishment of objectives. 
 
 
3.1.2 Lack of Sufficient Training Impacts  
 
TES-N Operator Experience Level:  TES-N was manned by four people: an IS1 team leader, an 
IS3, an ISSN, and a CTT1.  The IS1 had 6-9 months shipboard experience with TES-N, working 
with the Field Support Representatives.  The IS3 had a 4-week PTW training course and is PTW 
certified.  The other two had no previous experience with JFN systems.  Although the IS1 had 
extensive TES-N training, it focused on IPB, and operating the equipment for TST was new for 
this operator.   
 
No TES-N Mobile Training Team:  Because of typhoon avoidance, the TES-N Program Office 
(PEO IWS) Mobile Training Team (MTT) did not make it aboard for the bulk of the CPX. 
- Impact:  (1) Lack of training for C7F Staff prior to, and during the majority of, the CPX 
frequently forced the one dedicated full-time Intel Analyst into the role of TES-N and PTW/IPL 
systems trainer; (2) Lack of available TES-N expertise, forcing, for instance, NWDC ISR/Fires 
personnel to learn U-2 Mission Planning on their own, and delaying the one (part-time) ELINT 
Analyst from learning how to “fuse” ELINT into the TES-N Integrated Tactical Display (ITD).  
 
 
Team Leader Comments:  This exercise was valuable for getting operators to use the JFN 
system.  Under the concept of "train as you fight…fight as you train", it was less useful due to 
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the artificial/lack-of information flow into and out of the JFN system.  Information bypassed 
components of the JFN system at almost all levels in order to make the system work in an 
artificial environment.  Imagery analysts could not provide the mensuration because no geo-data 
were contained in the simulated image.  Nomination data was being dropped out along the path 
to ADOCS.  Using real-world assets is a financial burden but, if we are to train as we would 
fight, realism must be present.  Too many workarounds are needed in an artificial environment.  
To effectively train, and to effectively test information paths, we must be able to use the same 
information paths the system will use for a real operation.  Workarounds are not the correct way 
to train.  If the path in place doesn’t work, that needs to be corrected (emphasis by team 
leader).  The only way to identify such shortfalls is testing in a real environment. 
 
Simulation Effects:  Lack of realism in the simulation had a strong effect on training.  It impeded 
training because of low fidelity.  Early on the operators had a tendency to view the displays as 
incomprehensible, lowering their capabilities.  Their attitude toward TES-N was affected, 
lowering their desire to learn.  They had difficulty separating the system from the simulation.   
 
 
3.1.3 Systems / Data Impacts 
 
FBE Wide-Area Network (WAN) Connectivity:  The FBE WAN was inoperable for the first 
three days of the CPX (came up approximately 161400 April Guam time, after MSEL Events 
had ended).  The items most affected were: (1) AFSERS “MUSE” ISR video feed from Newport 
into TES-N afloat; (2) the JSAF M&S “entity” feed from Newport into AFSERS “TENCAP” (U-
2 simulator) afloat; (3) NWDC TST Target Folder Server accessibility; and, (4) here was no 
rapid, reliable means of coordination (e.g., IP phones or chat) between controllers (JECG, M&S, 
NWDC controllers) -- relied almost entirely upon asynchronous SIPRNET email.   
 - Impact:  Because of these limitations (no video feed, no U-2 simulation, no TST Target 
Folders, slow JECG coordination), CPX MSEL Events could not be run effectively until day 
four of the CPX.   
 
No Digital Point Positioning Database (DPPDB).  Because of typhoon avoidance, the DPPDB 
(classified tapes hand-carried by the NWDC Intel Officer) was not available for use in PTW. 
- Impact:  Could not meaningfully exercise the important TST processes of coordinating 
geo-refinement / aimpoint generation (e.g., taking video “chips” and conducting the required 
“visual point transfer” to accurately geoposition the TST). 
 
No Receipt of COMINT In SCI TES-N:  C7F does not currently use the SCI side of TES-N for 
COMINT analysis (etc.). 
- Impact:  This meant that any COMINT injects, intended as “tippers” for the TST MSEL 
events had to come to the JFN Team as hardcopy from the COMINT analyst manning the FIC 
Watch SCI GCCS-M workstation (remote from the JFN Team’s positions).  This artificiality 
negatively impacted the timeliness, focus of analysis (i.e., the COMINT Analyst wasn’t looking 
solely for TST tippers), and “fusion”. 
 
TES-N Interface with GCCS-M Functionally Inoperative:  The TES-N-to-GCCS-M interface 
remained inoperative for the entire CPX. 
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 - Impact:  TST nominations were never “pushed” to the COP.  The omission of this  
important step in the TST process, the Track step, to enhancing the commander’s situational 
awareness, and to the “context” in which TST engagement decision-making must take place.   
 
TES-N Could Not Attach Images to TST Nominations:  The Target Nomination application in 
TES-N did not provide for the attachment of accompanying images / image “chips” (a shortfall 
identified during FBE-J that was reportedly to be rectified by FBE-K).  
 - Impact:  During CPX MSEL Events, TST-related images were manually moved (FTP) 
to PTW, with the nominating analyst providing verbal cueing to the PTW operator as to which 
Target Block Number related to which image.  The PTW analyst then changed the image 
filename appropriately (much easier to do in PTW than TES-N), and saved the re-named image 
to a shared network drive.  NWDC personnel (due to lack of availability of other manning) then 
drafted a one-line ATI.ATR message in SIPRNET email (in MS Outlook), and attached the 
appropriate image(s) from the shared network drive, and sent the email to the NWDC TST 
Target Folder Server for ingest.   
 
   
3.1.4 Equipment Status Matrix  
 
The following three pages present the equipment status matrix.  It  shows the daily status of JFN 






COMINT (via SCI 
bcast) ELINT (via TDDS) IMINT (via JCA) 
U-2 Imagery (fm 
AFSERS TENCAP) 
U-2 Telemetry (fm 
AFSERS TENCAP)
  CPX:         
14-Apr 
KRSOC scripters 
not in place [no 
COMINT analysis 
tools in TES-N!!] 
TRE to TES-N 
wiring not in place 
No access to JCA 
fm Newport 
No mission plan 
built 
No mission plan 
built 
15-Apr 
KL rec'd by JIC 
Watch, but not 
relayed due to 
lack of specificity 
in amp line 
No receipt of "XX" 
TDDS traffic by 
anyone in force 
[from either HI or 
Newport sources]
Images in JCA 
IPL, but still have 
wrong country 
code 
No mission plan 
built 
No mission plan 
built 
16-Apr 
KL rec'd by JIC 
Watch, but not 
relayed due to 
lack of specificity 
in amp line 
No receipt of "XX" 
TDDS traffic by 
anyone in force 
[from either HI or 
Newport sources]
Images in JCA 
IPL, but still have 
wrong country 
code 
No mission plan 
built 




not given anything 
to script/inject 
Sent by Camp 
Smith, rec'd in 
GCCS-M, but time 
late in TES-N 
Successfully 
pulled from JCA 
IPL to BLR IPL 
Rec'd two SAR 
images, but too 
dark. 
No telemetry 
received [FSR told 
of missing script 
by Balt. OSF] 
18-Apr 
KL xmit'd late by 
JECG; no relay fm 
Watch due to lack 
of specificity in 
amp line 
Rec'd from Camp 
Smith, used as 




pulled to BLR IPL, 




EO plan); images 
remain too dark 
No telemetry 




Analyst had to be 
asked (a.m.); KL 
xmit'd late by 
JECG (p.m.) 
Rec'd from 
NWDC, used as 
cue by ISR Ops 
(Doc) 
Successfully 
pulled from JCA to 
BLR IPL, used by 
analysts in PTW 
and TES-N 
Changed base 
imagery to EO, 
successfully sent 
to TES-N, used by 
analysts 
Telemetry rec'd, 
icon in TES-N 
EMPS moved in 
"real time", etc. 
20-Apr 
Rec'd from Watch 
[no analysts on 
SCI TES-N] 
Rec'd from 
NWDC, used to 
cue ISR ops (Doc) 
and Screeners 
Successfully 
pulled from JCA to 
BLR IPL, used by 
analysts in PTW 
and TES-N 
Rec'd in TES-N, 
but not yet used 











Images to PTW 
for aimpoint 
refinement 
Target nom to 
ADOCS 






            
14-Apr No FBE WAN Can FTP, but no DPPDB 
SMTP 
unsuccessful No FBE WAN 
Attempted, but no 
indications of 
success 
15-Apr No FBE WAN Can FTP, but no DPPDB 
SMTP 
unsuccessful No FBE WAN 




FBE WAN and 
video up, but too 
late for use in any 
MSEL events 
FTP good, but no 
georefinement 
due to lack of 
DPPDB 
Only when FSR 
sends to his own 
SIPR email acct, 
then fwds to 
ADOCS 
Unable to send, 






Video rec'd, chips 
produced, used 
for target noms 
FTP good, but no 
georefinement 
due to lack of 
DPPDB 
Only when FSR 
sends to his own 
SIPR email acct, 
then fwds to 
ADOCS 
Unsuccessful 







Video rec'd, chips 
produced, used 
for target noms 
FTP good, but no 
georefinement 
due to lack of 
DPPDB 
Successful 
[TES-N unable to 
attach images; 








Video rec'd, chips 
produced, used 
for target noms 
FTP good, but no 
georefinement 
due to lack of 
DPPDB 
Successful 
[TES-N unable to 
attach images; 






Video rec'd, chips 
produced, used 
for target noms 
FTP good, but no 
georefinement 




many data fields  
are not properly 
populating 
[TES-N unable to 
attach images; 













DIOP and file 
transfers to 
ISRM 






        
14-Apr ISRM not manned No mission plan built Not attempted 
15-Apr 
Successful FTP 
[no DIOP due to 
no U-2 sim] 
No mission plan 
built Not attempted 
16-Apr 
Successful FTP 
[no DIOP due to 
no U-2 sim] 
No mission plan 
built Not attempted 
17-Apr 
Successful FTP 
[no DIOP due to 
no U-2 sim] 
Doc built SYERS2 
plan, but TENCAP 





[no DIOP due to 
no U-2 sim] 
Doc built legacy 
SYERS plan; 
TENCAP ingested 





[no DIOP due to 
no U-2 sim] 
Doc & IS1 Karr 
built ASARS2 
plan; good play 
back, but using 
EO base imagery
Attempted, but 
ISRM system was 
up and down 
20-Apr 
Told by FSRs that 
sim data from 
AFSERS cannot 
be DIOP'd 






3.2 EXPERIMENT PLANNED EVENTS 
 
The following are sanitized extractions from the Master Scenario Event List (MSEL).  These 
events were designed to provide stimulation to Joint Fires Network (JFN) analysts and operators. 
 The events were designed to start slowly and build in complexity to help "players" gradually 
learn and understand the analytical processes and information flows required to use JFN to 
support Joint Task Force (JTF) level operations such as Time Sensitive Targeting (TST).   The 
events were designed to stimulate the JFN operators to perform the following operations: 
Find and Fix - cross-int analysis to detect, precisely locate, and positively identify TSTs; 
Track - enter the TSTs into the Common Operational Picture (COP); 
Target - derive aimpoint coordinates and nominate the TST for engagement; 
Engage and Assess - monitor the engagement, and conduct preliminary Bomb Hit 
Assessment / Battle Damage Assessment (BHA/BDA); 
Re-Task - support ISR collection plan adjustment during execution; 
Re-Engage - support re-engagement of TST as required. 
 
These objectives were gradually introduced, with an initial schedule:  
 14-16 Apr:  Objectives 1 & 2 only [Find & Fix, Track]. 
 17-18 Apr:  Objectives 1-4 [add Target, Engage & Assess]. 
 19-20 Apr:  Objectives 1-6 [add Re-Task and Re-Engage]. 
 
The 16 MSEL events are laid out by day, with: Event number; target(s) and general location; 
event start time; ISR data types/sources.  A synopsis of the intent of each event is provided, as 
well as "Smart Notes" (where needed) to indicate specific details needed for the conduct of that 
event.  The following are the planned events by day.  The next subsection will describe 
differences between planned and executed events.  All are Guam days.   
 
14 APR - Objectives 1 & 2 [Find & Fix, Track] only. 
Event 09952X: SA site:  COMINT; ELINT; UAV EO video; EO still imagery. 
Collection assets required: 
Aircraft or National for COMINT  
Aircraft or National for ELINT  
Aircraft for EO 
UAV for EO video 
SYNOPSIS:  Cause various analysts (e.g., CTR, CTT, IS, OS) to rapidly fuse SCI and GENSER 
data, and get target reflected in GENSER COP. 
 
Event 09953X: Ground force C2 node:  COMINT x 2; open source/HUMINT; EO still 
imagery; EO video. 
Collection assets required: 
 Aircraft or National COMINT  
 Aircraft for EO 
 UAV for EO video 
 Intelligence summary  
SYNOPSIS:  Same. 
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15 APR - objectives 1 & 2 [Find & Fix, Track] only. 
Event 09951X: SCUD / support vehicle:  HUMINT/SOF; open source; COMINT; EO video (to 
detect and ID SCUD support vehicle). 
Collection assets required: 
 SOF SR HUMINT 
 National IMINT (EO) via JCA  
 Aircraft or National COMINT  
UAV for EO video 
 Intelligence summary  
SYNOPSIS:  Same, adding a "pull" via JCA to get imagery. 
 
Event 09955X: Ground force C2:  COMINT (location); COMINT (heavy volumes); COMINT; 
open source; JCA EO imagery; EO video. 
Collection assets required: 
National IMINT (EO) via JCA  
 Aircraft or National COMINT  
UAV for EO video 
 Intelligence summary  
SYNOPSIS:  same, adding a "pull" via JCA to get imagery. 
   
16 APR - objectives 1 & 2 [Find & Fix, Track] only. 
Event 09956X: SA site:  ELINT of SA radar (three transmissions from three locations -- "looks" 
and moves); EO video. 
Collection assets required: 
National IMINT (EO) via JCA  
Aircraft or National COMINT  
UAV for EO video 
SYNOPSIS:  Same as previous events, but making "tracking" element more complex by trying 
to follow mobile SAM's "shell game". 
   
Event 09957X: SCUD TEL decoy:  COMINT; UAV EO video (of vehicle partially CC&D 
covered). 
Collection assets required: 
National IMINT (EO) via JCA  
Aircraft or National COMINT  
UAV for EO video 
SYNOPSIS:  same as previous events, but making "find/fix" element more complex by forcing 
imagery analyst to measure vehicle, which will be too short to be an actual SCUD TEL. 
 
17 APR - objectives 1-4 [add Target, Engage, Assess]. 
Event 09958X: SA site:  COMINT; ELINT x 2 SA radars; P-3 AIP EO video. 
Collection assets required: 
Aircraft or National COMINT 
Aircraft or National ELINT 
National IMINT (EO) via JCA 
 Aircraft for EO video (track/orbit just out of SA max range) 
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SYNOPSIS:  Same as previous events, but adding rapid targeting, engagement, and initial 
BHA/BDA.  EO Aircraft gets "lit up" and shot at by SA but is out of range so missile misses; SA 
is engaged; video enables BHA/BDA by JFN operator. 
SMART NOTES: 
(1) EO Aircraft must be tasked in JTF collection plan for ISR (vs. ASW) 
(2) Track/orbit must be just out of SA max range 
 
Event 09959X: CDCM:  ELINT of coastal surveillance; HUMINT/SOF; U-2 EO imagery. 
Collection assets required: 
 Aircraft or National ELINT   
 SOF SR 
U-2 for EO (re-task note: aircraft must be within sensor range, but not yet tasked to 
collect against that site) 
SYNOPSIS:  ELINT tipper; SOF confirm activity, think it may be a decoy, but can't tell due to 
revetments and/or stand-off range; EMPS operator will need to dynamically re-task U-2 to get 
rapid "overhead" imagery. 
SMART NOTES: 
(1) U-2 (EO) must be in JTF collection plan, putting aircraft within sensor range, but not yet 
tasked to collect against that site; 
(2) U-2 mission plan/collection plan must be built and loaded into EMPS; 
(3) JFACC Forward must have the U-2 "token" passed from JFACC Rear. 
 
18 APR - objectives 1-4 [add Target, Engage, Assess]. 
Event 09954X: SA battery:  COMINT; ELINT of SA radar; EO video; JCA Radar still 
imagery. 
Collection assets required: 
Aircraft or National COMINT 
Aircraft or National ELINT 
 UAV for EO video 
 National IMINT (Radar) via JCA 
SYNOPSIS:  Some obscuration (ground fog?) of targets seen in EO video, requiring analysts to 
pull Radar imagery via JCA .  
 
Event 09954X-01: Artillery battery: COMINT; ELINT of EW radar; EO video;  JCA EO 
Imagery. 
Collection assets required: 
Aircraft or National COMINT 
Aircraft or National ELINT 
 UAV for EO video 
 National IMINT (EO) via JCA  




19 APR - objectives 1-6 [add Re-Task and Re-Engage]. 
Event 09957X-01: CDCM.  COMINT between HQ and CDCM unit; ELINT of radar; EO 
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video.  
 -- AND -- 
Event 09959X-01: a different CDCM. COMINT between HQ and CDCM unit; EO video. 
Collection assets required: 
Aircraft or National COMINT 
Aircraft or National ELINT 
 UAV for EO video 
 National IMINT (EO) via JCA  
SYNOPSIS:  Conduct two TST events simultaneously.  Analysts will have to recognize that 
multiple targets exist; ISR Ops will need to adjudicate use of video sensor to identify and 
conduct BHA/BDA. 
SMART NOTES: 
(1) COMINT should indicate same HQ, but two different firing units; 
(2) ELINT of only one radar, near but not co-located with firing units; 
(3) BHA should show initial engagement missed one of the firing units. 
 
Event 09953X-01: ground force C2 node.  COMINT; EO video; JCA EO imagery. 
Collection assets required: 
Aircraft or National COMINT 
 UAV for EO video 
 National IMINT (EO) via JCA  
SYNOPSIS:  Presence of a variety of vehicles and antennae will require multiple aimpoints.  
Initial COMINT reports must be transmitted no earlier than 191400 Guam, and Predator must be 
on station (within sensor range) no earlier than 1415, so that this Event is still “in progress” 
when SCUD “pops up” in next Event. 
  -- overlapping with -- 
Event 093900-10 (AADC MSEL).  COMINT; EO video; JCA EO imagery. 
Collection assets required: 
 SOF SR HUMINT 
 UAV for EO video 
SYNOPSIS:  SOF observe SCUD TEL on the road; report conveyed rapidly to Intel Watch.  
Report should force Intel Watch to notify AADC and ISR Ops.  ISR Ops (and TST) will need to 
prioritize between prosecution of C2 node and SCUD (consult TST Guidance Matrix).  
 
20 APR - objectives 1-6 [add Re-Task and Re-Engage]. 
Event 09915X: SCUD.  COMINT between HQ and SCUD battery; EO video (obscured by 
clouds/ground fog); aircraft SAR imagery. 
Collection assets required: 
Aircraft or National COMINT 
 UAV for EO video 
Aircraft SAR (Re-Task note: aircraft must be within sensor range, but not yet tasked to 
collect against that site) 
SYNOPSIS:  COMINT tippers; ground fog obscures EO video; should force collection 
adjustment to use U-2(SAR) to locate SCUD TEL. 
SMART NOTES: 
(1)  EO video must show fog/obscuration 
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(2) Aircraft SAR must be in JTF collection plan, putting aircraft within sensor range, but not 
yet tasked to collect against that site; 
(3) U-2 mission plan/collection plan must be built and loaded into EMPS; 
(4) JFACC FWD must have the U-2 "token" passed from JFACC REAR. 
 
Event 09915X-05: SA site.  COMINT; ELINT SA radar; UAV EO video; U-2(SAR) or other 
"precision" asset 
Collection assets required: 
 SOF SR HUMINT 
Aircraft or National COMINT 
Aircraft or National ELINT 
 UAV for EO video 
Aircraft SAR (Re-Task note: aircraft must be within sensor range, but not yet tasked to 
collect against that site 
SYNOPSIS:  UAV gets shot down by SA deployed near hospital -- should cause collection plan 
adjustment and collateral damage consideration. 
TIMELINE (20 April, Guam day/time): 
 1000:  COMINT indicates SA-15 deploying near hospital; ISR Ops should vector UAV 
to head toward the area. 
 1015? (must be prior to UAV coming into effective sensor range): SA Radar ELINT 
emission, simultaneous with loss of UAV video 
 1020? (immediately after loss of UAV video):  SOF report of aerial explosion near 
hospital, indicating that UAV got shot down.  
 
Event 09915X-01: CDCM.  COMINT; ELINT; EO video. 
Collection assets required: 
Aircraft or National COMINT 
Aircraft or National ELINT 
 UAV for EO video (a new one, since prior bird shot down in previous event....should 
have plenty of time to get from local AFB) 
 
 
3.2.1 Modifications to Planned Events  
 
During the experiment, modifications made to event details and also wholesale modifications to 
accommodate to operator training and expertise.  The following lists those modifications.  
 
4/14 The events were run as a training exercise for the TES-N operators.   
 
4/15 Events were not run operationally.  Rather, they were run to focus on one piece of the 
information flow at a time, e.g. obtain imagery from JCA, build U-2 mission plan, etc.  The TES-
N team was down to one person. 
 
4/16 Continue events with a one-person TES-N team.  Stop data collection at 1300 due to 
equipment difficulties.  Event is not being prosecuted as it would be operationally.  
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4/17 Run events as planned. 
 
4/18 Run events as planned. 
 
4/19 Change morning event from CDCM to Hind Helos.  Afternoon event will be a mobile C2 
node and a SCUD TEL as planned.  Afternoon, two targets compete for assets.   
 
4/20 Change event to the TST being a command post with eight targets.   
 
 
3.3 DAILY CONTEXT SUMMARY  
 
The following provides summaries of details that were important to the context for each day.  
This context frames each day's events and provides some insight into cause-and-effect for that 
day's results.  As was pointed out at the start of this section, events were strongly affected by 
manning and equipment failures.  The following context entries list these factors and their 
impacts.  This is done with a broad brush rather than focusing on details.   
 
Equipment difficulties with Ku band, communication between TES-N and ADOCS, and getting 
TES-N information to the COP were pervasive problems and may be assumed to apply to all 
days.  Lack of JFACC Afloat the low manning at JFACC Main also applies to all exercise days.  
As was noted above, these factors, and the lack of a baseline CONOPS, forced modification of 
this initiative to focusing on training observations, some basic information concerning JFN 
utilization, and preparation for FTX.  Thus, the following context will include only factors that 
relate to training and broad comments concerning JFN use for TST.  
 
4/14 Navy personnel assigned to be TES-N image analysts were untrained and the Mobile 
Training Team missed the ship's departure, resulting in a serious lack of TES-N proficiency.  All 
except the lead TES-N person (IS1 Karr) were pulled to other JIC duties.  Workarounds to 
compensate for equipment deficiencies were developed, mainly transfer of information by e-
mail.  
 
The level of manning is insufficient to support development and refinement of the TST process 
as had been planned.   
  
4/15 Lack of TES-N manning continued, thus no training could be accomplished.  
 
The TES-ADOCS ATI.ATR interface was not working so nominations could not be sent 
directly.  Lack of FBEnet, and no Ku connectivity, meant that workarounds were needed for 




4/16 E-mail continued to be the main workaround method.  ELINT, U-2 imagery, and posting 
of event images to JCA IPL were occurring for the first time.  The combination of some imagery 
and workarounds meant that the experiment could proceed.   
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4/17 Was able to proceed with ELINT, Predator, and national imagery.   
 
The MTT arived on board (ship pulled into Guam to pick up personnel left ashore due to the 
typhoon).  TES-N personnel returned and proper training proceeded.  Only one person was 
available part time to man ADOCS.   
 
4/18 TES-N was fully manned and the MTT was working alongside the operators.   
 
The experiment deviated from the exercise in order to have the TES-N operators prosecute the 
desired TSTs.  During the experiment operators prosecuted targets that had already been killed in 
the exercise.   
 
Operators reported that the simulation quality and lat-long problems interfere with their training 
and with operating TES-N. 
 
4/19 Personnel training progressed to the point where the operators could work with their 
TES-N station with some independence and were capable of evaluating the usefulness of the 
system.   
 
Two events were executed completely, from ELINT and COMINT through engagement.  
Sufficient imagery and Predator control were available to provide chips and nominations.  E-
mail workarounds for remaining equipment difficulties continued to be in place.   
 
The TST environment was rich enough to stress operator ability to perform sensor management 
and target identification and location.  However, the simulation interfered with evaluating 
operator capabilities to assess and manipulate imagery and make target decisions.  
 




3.4 SUMMARY OF CONTEXT CONSEQUENCES:   
 
The main impact created by the above noted difficulties, with regard to meeting this initiative's 
objectives, was that JFN was operated in an artificial environment.  Procedures used were not 
what are documented nor what will be used in the future for TST, hence evaluation of these 
procedures to determine JFN's contribution will have marginal validity.   
 
The experiment became decoupled from the exercise.  JFACC Main staff was operating to 
support the exercise as planned (see Appendix C for a description of this process).  The events 
being run in the BLUE RIDGE JIC for the experiment became mostly uncoupled from JFACC 
so that the full TST process from Detect to Engage could not be observed.  As a consequence, 
this report deals almost exclusively with JIC/TES-N processes.   
 
The processes that were being used did not produce results that could be used to evaluate SOPs, 
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as was planned for this initiative.  Information was obtained on having an afloat JIC participate 
directly in the TST process.   
 
This portion of FBE-Kilo operated as a personnel training period and equipment test period for 
FTX.  In that regard it was valuable.  TES-N operator training and performance were extensively 
observed and from those observations, a number of conclusions could be developed concerning 
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4.0  RESULTS 
 
As was stated in the Reconstruction section (Section 3), obtaining results for this initiative was 
strongly influenced by equipment and manning issues.  The results that have been obtained may 
be valid for a wider range of circumstances but have proven validity only for the conditions that 
existed during CPX.  The last topic of this Results section describes the range of validity.   
 
 
4.1 SIMULATION IMPACT ON TRAINING  
 
CPX simulation was designed to support the goals of determining the contribution of JFN (TES-
N) to TST and to determine appropriate TST SOPs.  TES-N's contribution is strongly dependent 
on the ability of JIC personnel to operate the system.  Thus, it is required that the simulation 
provide a realistic operating environment or the results will be contaminated by 
operator/simulation-presentation interaction effects.  With regard to SOPs, they cannot be 
evaluated if operators are modifying procedures on-the-fly in the experiment in order to utilize 
the simulation output.   
 
The simulation did not provide an appropriate training environment.  This point was strongly 
made by the operators and their supervisor.  The following are points made by the person who 
supervised event execution within the JIC 
 
Simulated Predator Video Quality Shortfalls:  There were three issues regarding the quality of 
the simulated ISR video:  (1) Analysts found it hard to read the Lat / Long read-outs on the TES-
N screen that was intended to provide the approximate location of the TST. 
(2) Analysts found it difficult to distinguish one simulated object from another.  
(3) Analysts found the base imagery used in the simulated video to be of insufficient quality to 
allow for any “contextual” analysis. 
- Impacts:   
(1) NWDC personnel had to frequently go to a different space on the ship to read the geo-
coordinates off of the NWDC Remote Video Server screen (which shows the video before it is 
fed into TES-N).  
(2) NWDC personnel often had to tell the analysts what they were looking at.  This removed 
much of the interaction and analysis required for (for instance) TST positive identification (PID), 
a significant step in the TST process.  
(3) Analysts often could not conduct important tasks in the TST process, for instance collateral 
damage estimates (CDE). 
 
U-2 Simulation Shortfalls.  There were four issues regarding the “stimulation” of TES-N by 
AFSERS “TENCAP” U-2 simulation:   
(1) The simulated Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) appeared too dark in the TES-N Screener 
application, and too grainy in the TES-N imagery manipulation applications (e.g., Remote View) 
to be of use in CPX TST MSEL events.  
(2) The U-2 simulation only operated with mission plans built for the U-2 SAR sensor package 
(e.g., ASARS2, ASARS2A), but not with mission plans built for the U-2 Electro-Optical (EO) 
sensor package (e.g., SYERS2).  
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(3) The nature of the AFSERS-to-TES-N interface apparently precluded the “DIOP” (Data 
Input/Output Port) of U-2 imagery and telemetry to the USAF’s Intelligence Surveillance 
Reconnaissance Manager (ISRM) at JFACC REAR (Hickam AFB, HI).   
(4) AFSERS “TENCAP” could not simulate the “waterfall” of imagery (either SAR or EO) in 
the TES-N Screener application that occurs when live U-2 sensors are in “search” mode (many 
mistake this “waterfall” for being high-resolution “UAV video”). 
- Impacts:   
(1) MSEL events were limited to simulated U-2 EO play (e.g., the watch leader had to modify 
those events that introduced cloud cover / ground fog, meant to force an ISR Operations 
adjustment from the EO ISR video to the U-2 SAR sensor).  
(2) & (3) had to build ASARS2/2A mission plans, but have the AFSERS output EO base 
imagery.  
(4) Without the “waterfall” (which is functionally like viewing high-resolution slow-motion 
video) screening for TSTs would have been limited to a series of “still” U-2 images.  Due to 
these factors listed above, and the lack of JFACC REAR mission planning support mentioned 
above, simulated U-2 data was not used functionally in any CPX TST MSEL events.  
 
 
4.2 PERSONNEL CAPABILITIES 
 
With the exception of the team leader, personnel in the JIC had no experience with TES-N.  This 
resulted in a CPX philosophy change to using CPX for training in order to be ready for FTX.  
Thus, most CPX results deal with training issues rather than JFN contributions to TST or SOP 
evaluation.  In perspective, the following five factors influenced all results: 
 Operator competence and its change over time with training. 
 Simulation artificiality impact on operators. 
 JFN system and connectivity failures. 
 Lack of applicable SOP.  
 C2 structure and manning.  
It is not possible to unambiguously sort out the influence of these five factor's on the results.   
 
In spite of developing procedures and workarounds on the fly, training those just developed 
procedures, and training system button pushing all at the same time, coupled with operator 
dissatisfaction with the simulation, the operators learned very quickly.  After three days of 
working with the system, operators were able to manipulate imagery, chip images, and make and 
transmit nominations quite rapidly.  It appeared that the limiting factor regarding processing 
speed was system problems rather than operator capabilities.   
 
Operators never developed an understanding of the full TST process and how TES-N and 
operators fit into that overall process.  They were working at one component of the overall 
process and developing an understanding of how to perform their component's function.  
According to the team leader, their competence would improve if they understood the full 
process.  In order to help this situation, the team leader rotated the image analyst's functions so 
they could train on more than one function.   
  
4.3 OPERATOR ACCEPTANCE OF TES-N 
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It is interesting that, in spite of dissatisfaction with image realism/quality and lack of familiarity 
with TES-N and TST processes, the operators were impressed with the system.  This can be 
summarized simply as: They recognized its possibilities.   
 
The ISSN reported the following:  
a.  TES-N is a very user-friendly piece of equipment.  Never having previously worked on the 
system, I felt it was very easy to learn. 
b.  Target nominations, downloading maps, and disseminating Predator or U-2 video feeds are 
very interesting things to be able to do.  The hands-on experience is great.  To be able to do it 
yourself, and understand the process, was very helpful.  To have combined the use of what used 
to take a few machines into one system is great.   
c.  The multi-tasking ability of TES-N greatly reduced the time it would take to download an 
image and annotate.  Plus, you could have DBO and ITD and EMPS all up at the same time 
while working on different projects.   
d.  TES-N helps my job by minimizing the time you would have to wait for imagery.  It also helps 
you in the way that you can pull up different windows to use different systems.  I do think that 
there needs to be more user time, more training for the system.  Some times I didn’t understand 
what I was doing, only that I was doing them.   
 
The IS3 reported: 
a.  For IMINT exploitation, the system is good.  The remote view ELT is easy to use.  That said, 
so is V. Tec on PTW.  A major drawback is the inability to drop validated aim-points.   
b.  Video screener is huge in terms of closing a large gap of time in the TST process.  The ability 
to redirect an asset and receive the real-time feed is a big advantage. 
 
 
4.4 TST PROCESS PERFORMANCE TIMES  
 
Most TST execution during CPX was done concurrent with training, fixing equipment problems, 
and developing process workarounds.  Thus, execution times were not representative of 
prosecution of TSTs with JFN.  It would not be appropriate to follow an execution thread 
through an end-to-end TST prosecution and draw conclusions regarding process capabilities.  
Even so, there are cases where components of the process are indicative of the enhanced 
capabilities provided by TES-N for TST.     
 
The time to build and transmit a target nomination after receipt of image chips from the image 
analyst was as short as 2 min.  This best case occurred after previous analysis and nominations 
for the same area had already provided some of the necessary background information.   
 
After detecting a possible target, directing a tactical sensor to obtain imagery to confirm target 
location and ID took 20 to 30 min.  This was with a UAV already in the area.   
 
Building a tactical sensor collection plan took on the order of 20 min.  
 
After an indication such as ELINT, it took on the order of ½ hour to locate, identify, and 
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nominate a target.  This includes obtaining and using national imagery.  This observation 
represents a composite of the times to perform functions when an operation is working well and 
stations are properly staffed.   
 
The above presents various times to perform TST process segments.  These times cannot be 
strung end-to-end to determine a total processing time.  There are interactions and overlaps 
between them.  In order to determine a total processing time, one needs uninterrupted flow 
through the total TST process.  There no such instances available during CPX.    
 
 
4.5 JFN AND THE TST PROCESS  
 
There are no meaningful CPX results on the use of ADOCS performance within TST.  
Engagement was not carried out within the JAOC.  ADOCS was used occasionally by the 7F 
Science Advisor both in the JAOC and JIC but only for practice and to determine if TES-
N/ADOCS connectivity was working rather than as part of TST prosecution and SOP evaluation. 
 The experiment produced no meaningful results for engagement of targets under the control of 
JFACC.   
 
Use of TES-N in the JIC was examined extensively, with the results compromised by the 
contextual factors described earlier in this report.  It was observed that the system can make 
significant contributions to the TST process.  However, it was pointed out by the operators that 
one does not necessarily have to have TES-N or a full JFN to process TSTs efficiently.  
Components such as JSIPS-N/PTW and GALE-Lite can be used to accomplish much of the TST 
process that occurs within the JIC.    
 
Operations within a JIC focus on IPB.  Participation in the TST process is not part of what they 
normally do.  If this is to become an operational reality, CONOPS and TTPs that focus 
specifically on a JIC will be needed.     
 
One of the goals of this initiative was to determine the added contributions provided by JFN to 
the TST process.  An adequate job in performing this assessment would require running the same 
scenarios with and without JFN, which was not done (and cannot be easily done in any venue).  
An alternate approach is to use CPX, or FTX, results to establish baseline capabilities from 
which one can determine excursions with subsequent experimentation.  This will also be difficult 
to do because the C2 configuration and processes used in CPX are atypical of what has been 
done in the past and may never be used again in the future.  Thus, the most that can be obtained 
from these results is an indication of possible JFN contributions to TST.   
 
CPX experimentation focused on a unit fully equipped with JFN.  There will be units that will 
participate in the TST process that will not be so equipped.  Also, JFN or some of its component 
systems could be down or communication links between them could be down.  In actuality, this 
was the case for CPX for information exchange between TES-N and ADOCS and TES-N and 
GCCS.  Thus, it will not be sufficient to formulate CONOPS and TTPs for JFN.  Also needed are 
procedures for less capable units or situations.  Some of these will simply entail developing 
checklists for actions to take, communications to fulfill, etc. by whatever means is available.  In 
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essence, a spectrum of processes needs to be developed.   
 
 
4.6 RANGE OF VALIDITY FOR RESULTS 
  
Experimentation plans develop a set of conditions within which systems and processes are 
tested.  These conditions define a known range of validity for derived results.  If the experiment 
is designed so that cause-and-effect relationships can be determined (as opposed to merely 
observations), it is possible to use those relationships to extend the range of validity to untested 
circumstances.   
 
The special circumstance of the CPX portion of FBE-Kilo is that the planned conditions were 
largely not achieved.  This situation was explained earlier in this report.  Thus, it is difficult to 
determine the range of validity for these results, or even whether they are valid for any 
operational situation that will be encountered.  Rather, we have reproted improvements that are 
needed in training, indications of TST performance using TES-N, and improvements in the 
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5.0  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 FLEET FOLLOW-UP 
 
Fleet Battle Experiments have two purposes:  (1) to advance and improve the capabilities of 
systems and processes, and (2) to move new operational capabilities to Navy operating units.  
Part of the reason for doing number one with operational units is that, at some point, capabilities 
testing must be done in a realistic, human-in-the-loop environment.  Part of the reason for a Fleet 
participating in an experiment is to improve capabilities and the ensuing "leave-behinds" that can 
occur.  Leave-behinds are not only equipment but also new or improved processes.   
 
To date, most leave-behinds have been transitory rather than permanent improvements.  A telling 
example was a comment made by VADM Metzger, then C7F, during an FBE presentation:  
"What happened to the processes we put in place following Delta?"  The answer was that they 
had disappeared due to staff changes.  The basic problem was that there was no process or 
program to make the changes permanent.     
 
It is recommended that NWDC institute a process with Seventh Fleet to take the results from 
FBE-K and develop TST CONOPS and TTPs, in partnership with the Fleet, that will be adopted 
by the Fleet.  Results from CPX indicate that follow-on development would most profitably be in 
the following areas: 
 1.  Development of TST CONOPS and TTPs for a BLUE RIDGE CJTF. 
 2.  Develop a concept for BLUE RIDGE as a hub for TST information. 
 3.  Following the hub concept, specify what systems are needed for the range  
     of users included in the network, including "disadvantaged" users.   
4.  Develop procedures and guidelines for TST operations for all users,  
     including situations when full JFN capabilities are not available,  
     or completely unavailable.  
 
Adopting this recommendation will entail a significant shift in the way NWDC does business.  
To date, personnel have ceased involvement with an FBE once it is completed, moving on to the 
next event.  Following this recommendation means that personnel would continue to work on the 
initiatives associated with an experiment for some time after it is physically completed.  This 
requires a shift of resources to the follow-up aspect of an experiment.  It is believed that doing so 
will produce a significant improvement in NWDC productivity as well as produce an overall cost 
savings to the Navy.   
 
 
5.2 EXPERIMENTATION STRUCTURE  
 
Operational field experiments are expensive, both in terms of real fund expenditures and in terms 
of the use of platforms and their personnel.  Field experimentation as the primary data 
acquisition means is not cost effective.  Also, experience has shown that it is not possible to 
produce quality results when there is an overlap between analysis for one experiment and 
planning for the next.  With such overlap, lessons learned do not carry over into improvements 
for the next event.   
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Another problem involved the mechanics of having a "learning" experiment overlaid on a Fleet 
exercise.  There is a basic incompatibility.  Instead, one should have preliminary learning occur 
before going into the field then an exercise used for human-in-the-loop and operational testing to 
ensure validity.  Using this approach will allow for tighter coupling between experiment and 
exercise objectives.  The goals of the exercise will always be primary and one can adapt the 
experiment to those goals and produce high quality results that are directly applicable to the 
Fleet.   
 
It is recommended that a series of appropriate studies be performed to meet learning objectives, 
including workshops and even laboratory experiments.  Going into the field would occur only 
when needed for validation.  Hence, FBEs would not be events that occur on a regular schedule, 
and perhaps not exist in their current form.  Rather, when a particular study area progressed to 
the point of needing to do so, an appropriate venue for operational field-testing would be sought. 
 This could be identified as an LOE, a culmination event, or whatever would be appropriate.   
 
 
5.3 EXPERIMENTATION HARDWARE  
 
The experience in past Fleet Battle Experiments has been that there were always some 
equipment problems.  Perhaps this is to be expected, but it should be on a minor scale and the 
type of problem that can be quickly remedied.  FBE-K CPX was perhaps the worst situation 
encountered over the FBE series, with major equipment problems significantly disrupting the 
Fires Initiative.   
 
A policy is needed where equipment and interfaces must be fully tested and functionality 
ensured prior to an experiment.  A limited objective experiment (LOE) devoted to equipment 
testing is recommended.  This may be costly, but not be as costly as losing large portions of the 
desired results during a Fleet Battle Experiment.   
 
 
5.4 EXPERIMENTATION DATA 
 
Three types of data are typically obtained during an operational field experiment:  (1) subjective 
opinions about the performance of systems and processes, (2) subject matter experts logging 
event observations, and (3) electronic data logged within and between hardware systems.  The 
latter type includes simulation data.   
 
Planning an experiment requires close coupling between the detailed goals of an initiative and 
data elements to be captured.  Analysis of an experiment requires complete sets of all three types 
of data so that event chains can be reconstructed and the context within which events occurred 
can be fully understood.  A missing data element, or link, in the event chain breaks it and 
detracts from the ability to fully understand what occurred and why.  Absent context means 




To date it has not been possible to obtain all of the needed electronic data.  Part of the reason for 
this is that doing so is expensive and funds have not been made available.  The recommendation 
is made that the lists of electronic data requirements that have been provided be prioritized, 
decisions made as to which data will be obtained, system owners directed to obtain the data and 
make it available for analysis, and that adequate funding be provided for the purpose.  In 
addition, impact statements should be developed for those cases where the data will not be 
available and deficiencies be taken into account in experiment planning.    
 
 
5.5  EXPERIMENT PLANNING STABILITY 
 
CPX was an unusual situation in that there were major changes in the experiment structure (e.g. 
lack of a JFACC Forward) shortly before the experiment, and then personnel shortfalls due to 
BLUE RIDGE departing early for the typhoon.  However, it is not unusual in FBEs to have 
equipment and process changes occur right up to the beginning of an experiment.  Such changes 
disrupt data capture and analysis plans and can even make it impossible to capture data required 
to meet Initiative objectives.    
 
It is recommended that an experiment be "locked down" four months prior to its start.  An 
exception would be when there is a series of events that includes an equipment testing LOE prior 
to the field experiment.  In this case, the LOE should occur six weeks prior to the operational 
experiment and the lock-down occur within one week after the LOE.   
 
 
5.6 SIMULATION AND TRAINING  
 
CPX was different from previous FBEs in that it had a definite training aspect associated with 
JFN and SOP evaluation.  The stated purpose of the evaluations was that they be conducted for a 
particular C2 configuration and operational situation.  Training was to be conducted using TES-
N to prosecute TSTs.  The operational situation was to be created by simulation.  Training and 
evaluation were significantly negatively affected by the simulation's lack of fidelity.   
 
It is recommended that realistic training modules be developed for TES-N and JFN.  This could 
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Appendix A:  TST TIMELINES 
 
The following timelines present the principal occurrences in TST detect-to-engage cycles.  They 
are presented to give a representation of information and decision flow, and the amounts of time 
various actions take.  Only actions that are directly part of the TST process are shown; associated 
actions such as working on equipment and designing workarounds are not presented.  Dates and 
times are local (GUAM) time for those events that took place on the BLUE RIDGE.   
 
These timelines do not provide an accurate representation of TST times that would be expected 
in a real operational situation.  They are highly compromised by equipment and manning 
problems and by the training that was occurring.  Even so, they are useful as an indication of the 
types of performance that can be expected because parts of the process occasionally worked 
well.   
14 Apr:  No usable data. 
 
15 Apr:  No usable data.  
 
16 Apr:  No usable Data.  
 
17 Apr:  Morning Target 
0840 – Receiving Predator video from Newport. 
0900 – Attempts to send image chips unsuccessful, discuss target with JFACC.   
0914 – JFACC decides to strike without images. 
0925 – JFACC requests multi-tasking of sensor for BHA.  
0928 – Strike target. 
 
17 Apr:  Afternoon Target  
1233 – Using EMPS planner to develop U2 collection plan (until 1302, 29 min). 
1308 – TENCAP images received.  
1314 – Manual insertion of Lat-Long coordinates for nomination preparation.  
1324 – E-mail the plan to Newport.   
 
18 Apr:  Morning Target 
0735 – TES-N Receive ELINT from JTLS.  
0810 – Send images to JFACC via FTP and ELINT information.  
0818 – Gale check ELINT for Surface-Air site emissions.  
0825 – Direct Predator to the area. 
0826 – Find SA6 in imagery, chip an image. 
0827 – Send chip to JFACC.  
0835 – Image analyst nominate the target.  
0839 – JFACC decides to strike at 0900, decision to use Predator for BHA. 
0857 – Predator feed being received by TES-N . 
0900 – Strike target.  
0901 – Chip images with smoking targets. 
0902 – Send chips to JFACC.  
0905 – Send second chip to JFACC. 
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0906 – Find a second launcher.  
0910 – JFACC announces a 40 min window for restrike and BHA. 
0915 – National imagery sent to TES-N shows additional targets.  
0920 – Analysis of additional targets complete, chips sent to JFACC.  
0925 – Send massage to JFACC describing targets, restrike set for 0945.  
0944 – Restrike confirmed. 
0950 – Send new chip showing no damage.  
1011 – Confirmation site destroyed, send chip.  
 
18 Apr:  Afternoon Target 
1250 – Have ELINT but not imagery of artillery.   
1258 – TTES-N finds target in imagery, chip image.  
1307 – Image analyst has found at least 4 targets.  
1309 – Analyst asks for Predator zoom-in.  
1332 – TES-N target nomination submitted via ATI.ATR.  
1333 – JFACC has nomination, requests via Chat a better description.  
1356 – JFACC hasn’t accepted nomination because of no images, insufficient information.  
1400 – More information provided via voice.    
1413 – Targets struck.  
1416 – Imagery shows smoke on targets.  
1420 – Send BHA chip.  
 
19 Apr:  Morning Target  
0810 – Video feed received.  
0824 – ELINT received. 
0836 – Strike underway. 
0839 – Predator video shows one target destroyed.  
0841 – Chip images. 
0844 – JFACC requests national imagery.  
0845 – National imagery not available.  
0914 – TES-N has national post-strike images via FTP. 
 
19 Apr:  Afternoon Target 
1405 – Check national imagery. 
1407 – Predator flying and recording. 
1412 – Look for possible C2 node on video.  
1415 – Image analyst looking for target on national image using verbal Lat-Long cue.  
1420 – ELINT operator directed to watch for TBM launch.  
1422 – Possible targets found on national image.  
1424 – JFACC asks for national image. 
1425 – National image sent to JFACC. 
1430 – HUMINT report of SCUD TEL.  
1433 – Moving TEL seen in Predator video.  
1434 – Decision to nominate TEL.  
1440 – Resent national image to JFACC.  
1458 – Report second SCUD which hasn’t been nominated.  
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1503 – New national image, send nomination with image.  
1506 – Lat-Long for search given to image analyst via paper note.   
1510 – Three TES-N nominations are in ADOCS, DTFs made. 
1517 – Third SCUD located.  
1535 – BHA images received.  New, found 4 school bus-like objects, 1 car on AFSERS images.  
1550 – Call strike on all four targets.  
1552 – Video shows both damage and that strike missed the target (smoke off target).  
1602 – See second TEL burning, Predator goes home.  
 
20 Apr:  
0929 – COMINT received for a SCUD from Battle Watch. 
0930 – CrossINT being done with Gale. 
0933 – Have Bar Lock radar on ITD, not on Gale. 
0934 – Image analyst requests Predator zoom in.  
0936 – Image analyst found Bar Lock.  
0937 – Image analyst directs Predator to go under clouds for better imagery.  
0942 – Chip an image.  
0944 – Sending national image from JIC JSIPS-N to TES-N. 
0948 – Image analyst asks Predator for an exact spot.  
0949 – National image reveals two possible targets, verbally gives Lat-Long to image analyst.  
0950 – Going below clouds to check another possibility found on national imagery.  
0958 – Improved imagery video being received from Predator.  
1000 – Chip image of possible radar target. 
1003 – Chip image of a truck. 
1004 – ID an armored vehicle. 
 TES-N sends ATI.ATR nomination for the radar. 
1005 – Chip a large tent.  
1006 – ELINT IDs four Bar Locks, two in region of interest.  
1012 – Second nomination, support vehicles. 
1016 – Inquiry about collateral damage danger for nominations 19 and 20, report none. 
1025 – Make third nomination.  
1029 – Image analyst sends overview chip to PTW. 
1030 – Send last four chips to JFACC ISR-M.  
1033 – Predator operator zooming in on site.  
1035 – MSEL manager directs crew to look for a second radar site.  
1037 – Found and chipped second radar site.  
xxxx – Fourth nomination sent, arrival confirmed.  
1043 – Nomination 0022 sent.  
1053 – Nomination 0023 sent.  
1055 – Image analyst has image of two vehicles.  

















Appendix B:  CJTF TCT PROCESS – TT03 CPX   
 
The following material is an extraction from the FBE K Sea Strike Experiment Plan.  It is 
presented here, with the original section numbers (italicized to distinguish them from this 
report's numbers), in order to include in this report a record of the planned TST processes aboard 
the BLUE RIDGE during CPX.   
  
2.2.1.1  Concept for TST support to the embarked staff(s) 
 
During the conduct of FBE K, the JFACC will use the following six-step process.  This sequence is 
in conjunction with the current USAF planning and execution cycles for prosecution of TSTs.  The 
planning to the conduct of TST operations and continued Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace 









The JFACC Time Critical Targeting (TCT) Cell structure is per the JFACC Afloat SOP and the JTF 
507/519 SOP.  (For the purpose of this EXPLAN and FBE K, the terms TCT and TST can be used 
interchangeably, based on the preference of the particular organization involved.)  This team is lead 
by a TCT Watch Officer that has various intelligence and offensive operations subject matter experts 
at his/her disposal.  He is a direct representative of the Chief of Combat Operations (CCO) in the 








































Figure 1.  JFACC Afloat TCT Team Structure 
 
 
2.2.1.2  Supporting Technologies. 
 
During FBE K, the naval Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS) Navy interface is through 
the Joint  Fires Network – JFN.  This is a system of systems anchored by the JFN family of systems, 
GCCS-M and ADOCS.  It will provide the bulk of the TST functionality required by the JFMCC 
staff to conduct both JOA wide and battlespace specific TST operations.  This interoperability 
provided by the JFI will also  enable seamless transition of TST authority/responsibility to the JFC 
or his designee if required.  The components of JFN within the experiment are described below: 
 
2.2.1.2.1  Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) / Land Attack Warfare 
System (LAWS) 
 
The ADOCS / LAWS is the cornerstone toolset in the processes described in this EXPLAN.  It 
facilitates the timely engagement of fixed and Time Sensitive Targets (TSTs) by facilitating rapid 
dissemination of targeting data to personnel within the TST process.  ADOCS is the base software 
application, with LAWS being the maritime configuration of that application.  ADOCS is the asset 
management, weapon target pairing, and information dissemination tool used by the JFC/JFACC/AP 
Cell at the operational level.  LAWS is used by the AP Cell and the engagement nodes at the tactical 
level.  The ADOCS/LAWS consists of PC-based workstations distributed aboard the USS BLUE 
RIDGE and at other remote sites (supporting the engagement nodes) using SIPRNET as the network 
pathway.  ADOCS/LAWS will interface to a number of other to receive situational data and target 
nominations.  ADOCS/LAWS is designed to increase situational awareness, automate processes for 
weapon-target pairing, and automate coordination between joint forces engaging both preplanned 
and emergent targets.  ADOCS configurations will be used at the JTF and component level.  LAWS 
will be used within the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander command and control 
heriarchy. 
 
2.2.1.2.2  GCCS Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Capability (GISRC)  
 
GISRC will reflect sensor tracks and payload employment for certain airborne sensors.  This 
capability  is required in order for the sensor net to provide smart options for flexing. Additionally, 
GISRC will be used as the ISR screening tool for EO/IR sensors in FBE-K.  GISRC will be used on 
the DD(X), vE-2C, and the vANZAC in FBE K   GISRC is a software suite consisting of five major 
applications or segments: 
• Situational Awareness Segment – displays multiple ISR data sources as iconic Information on 
NIMA vector map backgrounds. 
• Reporting and Dissemination Segment – creates and disseminates multiple ISR/Ops messages 
types over several different communications paths. 
• Video Display and Tracking Segment – displays analog video and provides a capability to 
initiate and maintain tracks on targets displayed in the video. 
• Situational Awareness Display Client – accepts and displays information being processed on a 
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remote GISRC workstation 
• C2PC embedded. 
• Will serve as the target nomination clearing point for all target nominations that do not use the 
FBE K ATI.ATR standardized format. 
 
2.2.1.2.3  Joint Fires Network  (JFN) 
 
The JFN is the centerpiece of a family of systems that includes the Remote Terminal Component and 
the Remote Terminal Component Lite (RTC/RTC Lite), Precision Targeting Workstation (PTW), 
The JSIPS Concentrator Architecture (JCA).  This family of system provides cross-INT database 
management, collection planning functionality, target geo-refinement, sensor control capability, 
image handling and processing capability, targeting data uplink capability, JSTARS MTE (auto 
tracking), and multi-INT fusion capability to the JTF when embarked aboard USS BLUE RIDGE. It 
performs tasks at both the TOP SECRET/SCI and the GENSER SECRET level, using Radiant 
Mercury as the filter.  This is the current U.S. Navy segment of the joint Distributed Common 
Ground Station (DCGS) capability.  A detailed description of JFN can be found in the NWDC 
TACMEMO 2-01.1-02 – Naval Fires Network. 
 
 
2.2.1.3  The TCT Team Process. 
 
The detailed process used by the TCT Team to prosecute TSTs within the battlespace during the 
TT03 CPX will be the same as that used during the TT03 FTX / FBE K.  The difference between the 
two events will be that during the FTX, some experimental targeting and collaborative toolsets and 
supporting techniques will be examined in an effort to see if such toolsets/techniques enhance or 
detract from the warfighter’s ability and effectiveness to conduct TST operations.  The PACAF 










2.2.1.4  Integration of FBE K Toolsets / Processes into the TCT Team Process 
 
The functional and system processes described in the process in Figure 3, but enabled through FBE 
K toolsets and or procedures are graphically depicted below in Figures 3 through 14.    These 
descriptions take track events through the time sensitive targeting process described above and 
targets through the F2T2EA cycle.   
 
Note:  Only Figure 9 is shown below.  For the full set see the Experiment Plan.  
 
COP Track Inject.  In this sequence a TST “manual contact” is created and sent to GCCS-M.  COP 
Analyst modifies new “track name” to match TST’s target number.  TST “track” distro’d to GCCS-
M (COP Synch Tools) and to ADOCS (TDBM relay) in an effort to build situational awareness (SA) 
and allow increased ease of target coordination and prosecution by the appropriate 
personnel/agencies within the JTF.  COP track management for both plaers and JECG personnel 
























Appendix C:  JFACC TCT PROCESS – TT03 CPX 
 
The following material was written to provide a record of the planned TST processes at JFACC 
ashore at Hickam Field during CPX.  This JFACC TST process was used for the exercise.   
 
JFACC TCT Organization Overview 
 
The Combat Operations Division (COD) reported to the Joint Forces Air Component 
Commander (JFACC) and had overall responsibility for implementing the TCT prosecution 
process. The Air Operations Center (AOC) Director was responsible for the COD and provided 
liaison between the COD staff and the JFACC, during Tandem Thrust 03 (TT03) Command Post 
Exercise (CPX). Within the COD, the Chief of Combat Operations (CCO) designated a Time-
Critical Targeting Chief who established a TCT team to coordinate TST validation and provide 
attack execution authority. The TCT prosecution process was based on the USAF ‘kill chain’ 
concept, illustrated in Figure 1, that is comprised of six operational functions: Find, Fix Track, 
Target, Engage, and Assess (F2T2EA).   
 
 
Figure C-1.   USAF ‘Kill Chain’ Concept 
 
 
The TCT team was tasked to quickly F2T2EA Time Sensitive Targets (TST) within the 
execution phase of the ATO timeline.  TST’s were categorized as those critical, scenario specific 
targets identified in daily commanders guidance and/or intent messages.  The Air Force uses the 
term TCT to describe the TST F2T2EA cycle. 
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The Time-Critical Targeting Chief was responsible to the CCO for the TCT prosecution process. 
 The CCO worked closely with the AOC Director and the JFACC during TCT operations to 
ensure all worked from a common situational awareness (SA).   Figure 2 provides the overview 
structure of the JFACC TCT team and includes information flow observed during TT03 CPX.   
 
The TCT team contained two primary support sections:  ISR Section and Attack Operations 
Section.  The Senior Intelligence Duty Officer (SIDO) was the focal point for the ISR Section 
and was responsible for ISR TCT integration and support.  The SIDO coordinated with ISR staff 
and nominated TST’s for approval and prosecution to the TCT Chief.  The Attack Operations 
Section coordinated with the TCT Chief, SIDO, and CCO to develop TST engagement options 
for approved nominations.  In a parallel effort during engagement option development, the SIDO 
coordinated with the ISR team for the Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) mission tasking 
necessary to complete the cycle after target engagement. It should be noted that during TT03, 
coordination between TCT Team and senior decision-makers was not serial but was observed to 





























The principal role of the ISR Section during TCT operations was to lead the Find, Fix, Track, 






















IP VOICE  
CHAT 
 55
of the ISR Section observed during TT03. Key functions of ISR Section observed during TT03 
include: 
• Conducted Predictive Battle Space Analysis (PBA) for TCT based on Intelligence 
Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) conducted for deliberate planning/ATO generation.   
[Note:  PBA was notional during the exercise. Discussions between TCT ISR Section at 
AOC and JTF ISR staff on BLUE RIDGE was limited during the CPX]  
• Conducted dynamic sensor re-tasking for those assets not under direct collection 
management authority of the TCT team. 
[Note:  TT03 process required ISR Section to request sensor re-tasking through the JECG 
and USS BLUE RIDGE. In real world, the SIDO would have capability/authority to 
reposition sensors to Find/Fix TST.  If JFACC were afloat then ISR Section would have 
reach-back capability to support dynamic sensor re-tasking]. 
• Tracked ISR data and provide TST nomination to the TCT Chief for valuation 
• Coordinated with external agencies to fully integrate all possible ISR capabilities in support 
of TCT (ELINT, COMINT, HUMINT, IMINT) 
• Ensured track quality and geo-location support desired weapons options and address any ID 
conflicts 
• Tracked TST’s throughout TST “life-cycle” and maintain situational awareness on all active 
TST’s.  
[Note:  Intelligence information regarding TST’s was shared between the BLUE RIDGE 
TES-N and AOC ISR-M.] 
• Provided support to Attack Operations Section during target pairing function against a 
particular TST (e.g. Collateral Damage Assessment (CDA), Refined Mensuration) [Note: In 
reality the AOC (TST Authority) ISR Section would conduct CDA and target mensuration 
prior to forwarding TST nomination to Attack Operations, however, during TT03 CPX, CDA 
was requested from the JECG and target mensuration was sometimes conducted on USS 
BLUE RIDGE before sending imagery from TES-N to ISR-M (AOC) for TST engagement] 
• Compared nominated TST to daily ATO target list  
• Coordinated Phase II BDA 
[Note: SIDO did not have control of ISR assets during the exercise.  During TT03, all BDA 
requirements were coordinated through the Joint Experiment Control Group (JECG) and ISR 
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Attack Operations Section 
 
The principal role of the Attack Operations Section during TCT operations was to lead the target 
and engage function of the F2T2EA kill chain.  During TT03, the Deputy CCO was tasked as the 
Attack Operations Chief with responsibility of coordinating support required to successfully 
attack nominated TST with AOC personnel (Airspace Management, IO, Tanker Cell, JAG, Joint 
liaisons, etc.).  Figure 4 provides a Information Flow diagram of the Attack Operations Section 
observed during TT03.  Key functions of Attack Operations Section observed during TT03 
include: 
• Received the approved TST nominations from the TCT Chief and coordinated with the ISR 
Section (Targets) to develop a list of available assets capable of attacking the target. 
• Coordinated with AOC liaison elements (Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), 
MARLO, NALE, SOLE, for availability of alternative attack options for TST 
engagement/attack.  [Note:  MARLO or SOLE representatives did not participate] 
• Coordinated with IO Cell for potential non-kinetic kill solutions. [Note:  This was not 
observed during TT03 but step was identified during discussions with TCT Chief and Attack 
Operations Chief] 
• Provided TCT Chief with a prioritized attack asset list and package options for TST. 
• Provided TCT Chief with JAG perspective on TST’s prior to requesting final approval from 

























Figure C-4.  TT03 Attack Operations Section Information Flow – Target, Engage  
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1. Based on Commander’s Guidance, ISR assets will be resourced on ATO.  Emerging 
targets (ELINT, COMINT, HUMINT, IMINT, etc.) commence TCT process. 
2. Ensure TST Targeting Matrix and ROE is available at JIC (BLR), JAOC TST Cell (BLR) 
and AOC TCT Cell (Hickam) 
3. As tippers (sensor cues) flow in from a variety of sources, the ISR Section (SIDO) 
prioritizes which targets are potentially valid TST’s.  The SIDO enters potential targets 
on the ‘Emerging Target List’ and requests the track data manager to create a JTIDS 3.5 
track if a JSTARS unit has not already created.  The track data manager in the ISR 
Section will work with the Joint Stars Work Station (JSWS) operator to ensure tracks are 
created, updated, and dropped as appropriate.  
[NOTE:  During TT03, AOC TST Cell (Hickam) received initial target nominations from 
the ship and acknowledged receipt to the JAOC TST Cell (BLR) via IWS Chat, SIPRnet 
email or Voice Comm] 
4. Targets not categorized as TST’s will be forwarded to the Senior Offensive Duty Officer 
(SODO) for potential retasking of current ATO assets to accommodate, or processed 
back through Combat Plans for inclusion in subsequent ATO’s. 
5. SIDO directs TCT personnel (targets and current situation) to conduct a Predictive 
Battlespace Analysis (PBA) based on sensor cue(s).  PBA could be considered a more 
refined IPB of the specific TST location.  Collateral damage assessment is conducted to 
ensure TST engagement will not violate Commander’s Guidance or ROE. 
6. SIDO directs Collections Manager to modify collection plans, as required to cross-
correlate initial sensor contact.  SIDO must coordinate with TCT Chief and CCO prior to 
re-tasking sensors on current ATO. 
7. SIDO evaluates sensor data collected. If target is a TST identified on Joint Integrated 
Prioritized Target List (JIPTL), the SIDO will nominate the target to the dynamic target 
list. 
8. After a target is nominated to the dynamic target list, the TCT Chief will assign the target 
a team in the Attack Operations Section.  
[NOTE:  Real world operations typically include three attack coordination teams to 
handle multiple high priority TST’s simultaneously.  CCO and TCT Chief will adjust the 
number of teams as required by the operational tempo.  Instead of creating teams with 
stovepipe focus (geographic areas or specific target sets), each team should be able to 
flex to any geographic area/target set as directed by the SIDO and TCT Chief] 
9. The attack coordination team is responsible for friendly deconfliction, coordination with 
SOLE/BCD/MARLO for attack options, asset nomination based on threat, weather, 
response time, weapons effect, airspace deconfliction, Positive Identification (PID), 
Rules of Engagement (ROE), and point mensuration, as required. 
10. The attack coordinator works closely with the Targeteer (ISR Section) to ensure 
mensuration and collateral damage assessment is conducted and current; then completes 
an electronic checklist for the attack as posted on the shared view of selected chat room 
application.  When data form is complete, the attack coordinator presents the attack plan 
to the TCT Chief for approval.  The TCT Chief will review and present recommendations 
to the CCO, AOC, and JFACC. 
11. In parallel to the attack option development, the SIDO coordinates with Collections 
Manager and Current Situation to identify ISR resources required for a Phase II BDA and 
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plans BDA mission(s), if required. The primary BDA will be conducted and verified by 
platforms conducting the strike (Phase I).  However, if Phase I BDA is unsuccessful, the 
SIDO will provide recommended approach to dynamically retask assets to conduct Phase 
II BDA. 
12. Once the TST strike package is approved by the JFACC, the TCT Chief directs the C2 
duty officer to pass the tasking via SATCOM TCT net to the C2 package Commander in 
the aircraft. 
 [Note:  All approved strike packages were forwarded through JECG during TT03 CPX] 
13. The attack coordinator ensures the strike package/target information is forwarded to the 
appropriate duty officer (track data manager) to pass up to the attack aircraft. 
 [Note:  Assumes that weapon target pairing is Air Force strike aircraft.] 
14. The track data manager sends a 9.0 tasking message to the aircraft and works with the 
surface track coordinator and the JSWS operator to ensure the track is  updated with 
accurate coordinates and elevation. 
15. The C2 Commander on Aircraft will conduct Phase 1 BDA and pass information to the 
C2 Duty Officer who informs TCT Chief of the results.   
16. The TCT Chief coordinates with the SIDO, CCO and JFACC to decide if Phase II BDA 
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